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This paper focuses on sociology and the study of human nonhuman animal relations.  
Using as a catalyst referees’ comments on a previous paper about experiments using 
nonhuman animal subjects, in this present paper three problematics are identified 
and discussed.  These problematics centre on the ‘acceptable’ content of sociological 
inquiry, the ‘permissibility’ of advocacy-oriented sociology, and the ‘admissibility’ of 
nonhuman animal-advocacy to advocacy-oriented sociology.  The three problematics 
are explored through the lens of reflexive and critical sociology.  Two central 
questions are raised, firstly should sociology include the study of nonhuman animals 
and secondly can sociology advocate for nonhuman animals?  The paper concludes 
with the affirmative to both of these questions.   The paper ends by stressing that 
sociology has so much to offer the study of human nonhuman animal relations.  
Professional sociologists have a key role to play in enabling this work to move from 
margins to centre in published sociology.    
 
 





Sociology centres its attention on human societies, but societies are broader than 
the human.  Humans live in relation to nonhuman animals (Bryant, 1979) and these 
relations are often based in the human oppression of nonhuman animals (Nibert, 
2002).   Although human relations with nonhuman animals are taking an increasing 
role in social inquiry, sociologists often see the study of these relationships as 
marginal to the ‘proper’ human focus of sociology (for discussion see, for example, 
Kruse, 2002, p. 1).  Even when nonhuman animals are included, the human 
oppression of nonhuman animals is often overlooked.  What I argue in this paper is 
that the marginalisation (and more usual disregarding) in sociology of the human 
oppression of nonhuman animals reveals problematics in the project of sociology.   I 
focus my argument on three related threads: the ‘appropriate’ subject matter of 
sociology; the project of a value-free sociology; and the advocacy potential of 
sociology.  In doing so I raise two key questions; firstly should sociology include the 
study of nonhuman animals and secondly can sociology advocate for nonhuman 
animals?  Question one partly springs from a curiosity about why sociology should 
traditionally seek to limit its field of enquiry to humans alone, when it is proud to 
cover an otherwise wide sphere of activity (Author 2012).  Question two reflects on 
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whether it is acceptable for sociology to advocate for oppressed groups and, where 
there is acceptance, whether this can be combined with a broadening of the focus to 
advocacy for nonhuman animals.  These two central questions are thus entangled as 
support of advocacy in sociology does not necessarily generate support of advocacy 
for nonhuman animals.  This is because even those who accept the role of advocacy 
in sociology may feel that advocacy for nonhuman animals retreats from the ‘proper’ 
focus of sociology, which they see as the human.  
 
The impetus for this paper lies in comments made by two referees on a previous 
paper I submitted to this journalii, a paper that focussed on UK legislation associated 
with experiments using nonhuman animal subjectsiii.  To me, the comments made by 
the referees reveal problematics in sociology that have implications for sociological 
inquiry that centres its attention on nonhuman animals, for studies that explore 
human relationships with nonhuman animals, and for advocacy-oriented sociology, 
especially as it relates to nonhuman animals.  The following two comments made by 
one of the referees encapsulate these problematics.   
 
‘I think this article may be publishable but I do not recommend The 
Sociological Review.  Given the content and the advocacy-oriented approach I 
suggest the author considers submitting this article to [name of a journal that 
centres on nonhuman animal advocacy]...’and ‘...Although advocacy-oriented 
scholarship is undoubtedly justified on the grounds of bringing to the fore, 
the nature of injustice and exploitation experiences, in this case, by 
nonhuman animals in animal experimentation, it also raises interesting 
questions about the role of social science and its practitioners in terms of 
actively pursuing an animal advocacy agenda’ 
 
In these comments the referee clearly advises that the essence of my previous paper 
made it better suited to a journal that employs a critical approach to human 
nonhuman animal relations than a mainstream sociology journal.  Is this because of 
the approach I took or because of the subject matter itself?  The comment seems to 
embrace both possibilities as the referee separates ‘the content’ from ‘the advocacy-
oriented approach’ and suggests that both point the article to the alternative 
journal. All the same, the referee seems to accept advocacy-oriented work in 
sociology but still questions whether advocacy for nonhuman animals in sociology is 
appropriate.  Overall, the  comments raise three problematics for sociology that 
centre on the ‘acceptable’ content of sociological inquiry, the ‘permissibility’ of 
advocacy-oriented sociology, and the ‘admissibility’ of nonhuman animal-advocacy 
to advocacy-oriented sociology.   In directing my discussion to these three 
problematics I reflect on notions of the appropriate subject matter of sociology and 
the purpose of sociology.  I conclude by arguing that sociology is very well placed to 
examine human nonhuman animal relationsiv. Nonhuman animals are central to 
societies and thus are of sociological relevance even in terms of a constrained 
sociology that centres solely on humans.  Additionally, I maintain that advocacy for 
nonhuman animals is in keeping with a reflexive and critical approach to sociology, 
an approach that has now become mainstream.   Finally, I stress that professional 
sociologists have a key role to play in enabling work on human nonhuman animal 
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relations to move from margins to centre in published sociology.   I begin by 
exploring the question of what is the ‘acceptable’ content of sociological inquiry.  
 
the subject matter of sociology: sociology of nonhuman animals 
 
Nonhuman animals are more often than not excluded from the field of ‘traditional’ 
sociology. Accordingly, Barbara Noske observes that ‘the social sciences tend to 
present themselves pre-eminently as the sciences of discontinuity between humans 
and animals’ (cited in Kruse, 2002, p. 1) and Janet Alger and Steven Alger refer to 
‘the hard line that sociology has always drawn between humans and other species’ 
(2003, p. 69).  Certainly there have been changes. For instance, The British 
Sociological Association and the American Sociological Associationv now have study 
groups that centre on human nonhuman animal relations.  Moreover, there is a 
growing sociological literature in the field.  Despite the increasing sociological 
interest in human nonhuman animal relations it remains that, in the sociological 
tradition,  nonhuman animals continue to be viewed as at best marginal or at worst 
irrelevant (Arluke, 2002, p. 1).  Of course, sociology includes theories of history and 
systematic theoretical reflections on, and empirical studies about, contemporary 
societies thus, as C. Wright Mills warns, ‘to interpret the variety [in sociology] as A 
Tradition is in itself audacious’ (1970 [1959], pp. 29-30).  Taking his point, as broad as 
this sociological sweep is, it is curious that the sociological ‘tradition’ (if I might call it 
that) is largely confined to a narrow focus on humans.  
 
In the 1970s Clifton Bryant (1979) called on sociologists to recognise the significant 
roles that nonhuman animals have in human societies as, he observed ‘Our social 
enterprise is not composed of humans alone’ (1979, p. 417).  Because human 
societies are suffused with nonhuman animals, Bryant argues that sociology could 
gain a great deal from investigating this observable reality.  For example, often 
humans eat the flesh of nonhuman animals and wear their skins and hair as clothing.  
Humans capture and enchain nonhuman animals. Nonhuman animals live with 
humans in their homes and work for humans in myriad ways.  Human entertainment 
often involves nonhuman animals and human speech frequently invokes nonhuman 
animal imagery.  Bryant uses the term ‘the zoological connection’ to encapsulate the 
influence of nonhuman animals in human societies and this zoological connection, 
he argues, has been for the most part neglected by sociologists (1979, p. 399).  In his 
words,   
 ‘In spite of the evident prominence of zoological influences in our culture 
and the subsequent import for our social lives, the sociological literature is 
largely silent on animal-related human behaviour. This is an unfortunate 
oversight which handicaps our acquisition of a comprehensive understanding 




Consequently, Bryant calls on sociologists to pay attention to this neglected area for 
the reason that this might yield insights ‘concerning the interactional process, social 
motivation, the influence of value systems on perception, socialization and 
personality development, human violence and its sublimation, and the social 
dynamics of anthropomorphism’ (1979, pp. 404-5).  Despite this call, study that 
includes nonhuman animals remains marginal (at best) and resisted (at worst) in 
sociology.   This is curious because human relationships with nonhuman animals are 
grounded in the institutional arrangements and systems of belief that comprise 
human societies (Nibert, 2003, p. 6), arrangements and systems that are central 
features of sociological inquiry.  Yet, unlike anthropology, which has ‘run with the 
ball’ with the study of human nonhuman animal relations (Arluke, 2002, p. 1), 
sociologists have seemed rather anxious about sociological inquiry of human 
relations with nonhuman animals (Kruse, 2002).   But, even if some sociologists find 
it difficult to imagine a sociology in which nonhuman animals are studied in relation 
to humans (Nibert, 2003, p. 21), others such as Bryant (1979), Adrian Franklin (1996), 
and Rhoda Wilkie (2010) have focused their attention on the sociology of nonhuman 
animals. This sociological attention is part of the broad field of Animal Studies.  
Richard Twine observes that Animal Studies is  a multidisciplinary and 
transdisciplinary development that has emerged from the humanities and social 
sciences, which focuses attention on a re-evaluation of the ‘the role and presence of 
nonhuman animals’ (2010, p. 1).  Despite the social scientific origins of Animal 
Studies, study of nonhuman animals is treated as marginal in sociology. Why is this?  
The reason seems to lie in the traditional sociological acceptance of categorical 
differences between humans and nonhuman animals which, Alger and Alger 
observe, ‘misconstruct[s] animals as inferior, in order to construct humans as 
superior’ (2003, pp. 74).  A most obvious proponent of this approach is George 
Herbert Mead. 
 
Mead’s (1934) assertion that nonhuman animals are outside the realm of 
sociological inquiry because of their professed lack of perception, imagination, and 
language presents a considerable barrier to the development of what Arluke calls 
‘sociological other animals studies’ (2002, p. 1).    Mead argues that the human use 
of language is especially important in the development of shared meanings and the 
sense of self, which he contends are the proper subject matter of sociology (1934, p. 
135).  Shared meanings are essential to communication and interaction, and Mead 
claims that such shared meanings are the distinctive feature of humans in societies. 
Although Mead accepts that nonhuman animals can carry out meaningful actions 
(such as collecting wood) that are designed to attain goals (such as building a 
shelter), he maintains that their behaviour ‘lacks the premeditation and shared 
meanings that characterize human behaviour’ (Irvine, 2003, p. 46).   Mead (1934) 
distinguishes between the ‘conversation of gestures’ that he sees as characterizing 
the instinctive acts in which  both humans and nonhuman animals engage, and social 
acts of communication via ‘significant symbols’ (i.e. language), which he views as 
uniquely human.  For Mead, the conversation of gestures is unconscious and hence 
is not significant for sociology; it is communication through language that, he 
concludes, is the proper subject matter of sociology.  This is because he views 
language as enabling humans, and only humans, to anticipate the consequences of 
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their actions, evaluate alternatives, and organize their actions with others (Irvine, 
2003, p. 46).   Mead accepts this as evidence of the unique human ability to imagine.  
This is central to Mead’s sociology because it is this ability that allows humans to 
view themselves as if they are external objects and, for him, this human attribute 
‘demonstrates our evolutionary advancement on animals’ (1934, p. note 1).   
 
Mead’s notion of the ‘generalized other’ is essential to his position on the human 
self. Via the generalized other, humans within a particular society have a view of the 
expectations about actions that others have and, in consequence, they try to behave 
in ways that are expected of them (Mead, 1934, p. 155).  For Mead, taking into 
account the attitudes of others is essential to acting ‘intelligently’ or ‘rationally’ 
(1934, p. 137) which, again, he see as the province of humans alone.  Intelligent or 
rational action is not founded in instinct because, he argues, intelligent action is 
based in choice, and the ability to choose is rooted in having a sense of the past.  So, 
in sum, it is the purportedly unique social capacities of humans that Mead 
understands to be the subject matter of sociology and thus ‘sociologists...are 
supposed to study people, not other creatures’ (Kruse, 2002, p. 375).  Alger and 
Alger’s examination of sociology textbooks shows the extent of the conformity to 
this traditional sociological point of view; for example textbook authors often 
employ ‘distancing concepts’ (such as ‘instinct’) that are used to distinguish humans 
(who are constructed as uniquely without instincts) from nonhuman animals (who 
are constructed as being controlled by instincts) (2003, p. 81).  
 
Sociologists working in the field of Animal Studies have contested the traditional 
sociological contention that nonhuman animals are merely instinctual biological 
entities who do not display social complexity.  For instance, with reference to studies 
of both dog training and of cat negotiations over territory, Leslie Irvine challenges 
the notion that there is a purely instinctual root to nonhuman animal behaviour by 
noting the ways in which nonhuman animals modify their actions (2007, pp. 7- 8).  
There is much scepticism in broader sociology (and beyond) about such studies, 
based in suggestions that the results are no more than anthropomorphic projections 
as humans can only project human meanings onto nonhuman animals (for discussion 
see Arluke and Sanders 1996. pp. 48-52). Mead would concur because, in his 
opinion, nonhuman animals have ‘no mind, no thought, and hence there is no 
meaning [in their behaviour] in the significant or self-conscious sense’ (in Strauss, 
1964, p. 168).  Nevertheless, Arnold Arluke and Clinton R. Sanders point to a wealth 
of research that refutes views such as Mead’s.  They refer to studies, for example of 
dogs’ interactions with their human guardians,  that indicate that nonhuman animals 
are ‘minded social actors’.  They conclude that work such as this provides evidence 
of the mindfulness of nonhuman animals, which can help sociologists to examine 
and understand ‘interspecies interaction’ (Arluke and Sanders, 1996, p. 81). 
 
Arluke and Sanders observe another particulary vociferous doubt expressed by some 
sociologists who make the objection that glossing over any differences between 
humans and nonhuman animals could lead to ‘ideologically and empirically 
questionable conclusions’ about the role of instinct in human behaviour (1996. p. 
52).    There are, of course, unassailable sociological arguments about the rejection 
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of the role of instinct in humans.   These are plain in sociological critiques of 
sociobiological theories that regard humans as one species of animal like any other 
whom ‘just like any other species… have a set of genetically determined dispositions 
to behavior’ (Dupre, 2004, p. 892).  In proposing that there is such a thing as ‘human 
nature’ that enables and constrains human behaviour, sociobiologists point to what 
they claim to be natural differences among humans, for example in their degrees of 
intelligence.   Accordingly, the sociobiological position centres on biological 
foundations rather than the social foundations of inequalities (for a critical 
discussion see, e.g., Guo (2006)).  Although the most well-known sociobiologist, 
Edward O. Wilson (1978), is eager to point out that he is merely describing biological 
differences that he feels lead to human inequalities, it is hard to ignore the 
justifications that sociobiology provides for a range of inequalities.  
 
Sociology has sound and compelling grounds for refuting such descriptions and 
justifications.  But refutations need not stop there as the glossing over, and indeed 
outright acceptance, of assumed hierarchical biological distinctions between humans 
and nonhuman animals leaves sociologically unchallenged the inequalities associated 
with being nonhuman. Sociologists such as Irvine (2007) and Arluke and Sanders 
(1996) advocate a deconstruction of this gloss.  They argue that there is a good deal 
of evidence that shows that many nonhuman animal species are more complex than 
is assumed. Of course, a focus on notions of complexity can lead to a range of 
problems. It could be inferred, for example, that assumptions about complexity 
support rather than refute notions of hierarchical relationships as it is only because 
some nonhuman animals are judged complex that they are worthy of being the 
subject matter of sociology, whilst those who are deemed less complex are seen as 
unworthy of notice. Accepting this vital point, if sociologists turn their attention to 
nonhuman animals as autonomous beings, sociological study could do much to 
enhance understanding of interactions between humans and nonhuman animals, 
among nonhuman animals, and among humans (Arluke and Sanders 1996. P. 57). 
 
 
So, returning to problematic one, it is hard to understand why human relationships 
with nonhuman animals should be seen as, at best, marginal or, at worst, irrelevant 
to the traditional acceptable remit of sociological inquiry. Sociology can learn much 
from exploring the multiplicity of human nonhuman animal relationships, as Franklin 
(1999) (among others) has shown.  However, Franklin points out that there is scope 
for a sociology of human nonhuman animal relations that is not solely about 
description of these relationships, because the sites of such relationships associated 
with, for example, farming, food, sport, experimentation, companion animals, and 
tourism have become ‘increasingly contentious and conflictual’ (1999, p. 2).   This 
brings me to problematics two and three, which centre on the ‘permissibility’ of 
advocacy-oriented sociology and the ‘admissibility’ of nonhuman animal-advocacy to 
advocacy-oriented sociology.   In order to consider these two problematics first I turn 





‘facts’, values, advocacy and the purpose of sociology 
 
 
It is useful to think about the purpose of sociology as this assists in consideration of 
the second problematic that I have referred to, which is the ‘permissibility’ of 
advocacy-oriented sociologyvi.  Martyn Hammersley offers a distinction between 
what he sees as two related purposes of sociology; the functional purpose (what 
purpose does it serve to the world) and the moral purpose (what purpose should it 
serve) (1998, p. 1.3).   For Hammersley, the functional purpose is to be ‘no more 
than a source of specialised factual knowledge about the world’ (1998, p. abstract).  
In this regard, Hammersley acknowledges his debt to Auguste Comte (1975 [1851-
54]), who described sociology as the scientific study of society as it really is.  Comte 
(1975 [1851-54]) sought to distance sociology from previous studies of society that 
applied theological approaches (which saw society as an expression of God’s will) 
and metaphysical approaches (which saw society as a natural phenomenon) as, he 
argued, such approaches tended to concentrate on how society should be.  But 
Comte’s plea for a straightforward approach is not as straightforward as it might 
sound, not least because the way in which society is conceived in the first place 
shapes the conclusions that might come from a study of society as it ‘really’ is.    For 
example, recalling the previous discussion about the place of nonhuman animals in 
sociology we can see that there is dispute about what is ‘society’.  For Mead, the 
social world is inhabited by humans alone and thus, for him, a sociology of society as 
it is should centre on humans in the world of humans.  Bryant’s view of the human 
world contrasts with that of Mead.  Bryant observes that the human world is 
populated by nonhuman animals and thus a sociological focus on society as it is, 
should make the zoological connectionvii.     All the same, Mead and Bryant seem to 
see eye to eye on the notion that sociology should commit itself to studying the 
social world (whichever way it is conceptualized) as it is rather than on how it should 
be.  Hammersley’s approach to sociology concurs with this. 
  
Hammersley sets out his twofold distinction about the purpose of sociology in 
critique of Gouldner’s (1975) reflexive sociological project.  Gouldner is critical of a 
factual-only sociological approach as he rejects the idea that sociology is a value-free 
enterprise that should disregard questions of morality (1975, p. 25).  In contrast to 
seeing sociology as the study of society as it is, Gouldner (1970) argues that 
sociology can provide the basis of ‘right living’.  He seeks to demolish what he 
understands to be the myth of value-freedom in sociology, instead arguing that 
‘value-related work’ has a long tradition in sociological study.  Most fundamentally, 
he insists, values ‘shape the sociologist’s selection of problems, his (sic) preferences 
for certain hypotheses or conceptual schemes, and his neglect of others..... [so] in 
this sense, there is and can be no value-free sociology’ (1964, p. 215).  In terms of 
this paper, choosing to study nonhuman human animal relations is inherently no 
more or less value-related than choosing to study economic class relations or gender 
relations.  In addition, Gouldner observes that a range of sociologists have published 
work that expresses their moral viewpoint.  For example, he notes that members of 
the Chicago School focused on the degrading effects of hospitalisation in a 
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psychiatric hospital (1964, p. 210).    Thinking about human nonhuman animal 
relations, sociologists working in the field of animal studies might focus on the 
detrimental and degrading effects of industrialized farming for nonhuman animals 
encaged in such places and for low paid humans employed there (e.g. see Wilkie 
2010).   
 
Gouldner’s notion of the primary place of values in sociology follows the thoughts of 
Mills (1970 [1959]).  Mills defines sociology as the study of problems and problems, 
he argues, are always associated with values because problems cannot be devised or 
expressed unless the attendant values (along with any threat to them) are made 
known (1970 [1959], p. 144).  For Mills, the central values of freedom and reason are 
the nub of sociology as sociology concerns, in his words, the ‘conditions and 
tendencies that seem to imperil these two values and the consequences of that 
imperilment for the nature of man (sic) and the making of history’ (1970 [1959], p. 
145).  Obviously, Mills centres his discussion on sociology of the human, however, his 
points are effective when we include Bryant’s zoological connection.  For example, 
humanocentric values are invoked when sociological studies of the problems of 
power and the use of pharmaceuticals leave unquestioned, and indeed seem to 
uncritically accept, the use of nonhuman animals for testing such products (e.g. see 
Buswell, 2006, p. 303).  Thus, problems and values are interlinked.  In the study of 
problems, Fred H. Blum comments, for Mills ‘Facts without values are meaningless. 
Values without facts are mere abstractions’ (1964, p 164).  Like Mills, Gouldner 
(1964) insists on a commitment to values in sociology but, warns Hammersley, this 
commitment could lead sociology into considerable problems. 
 
Hammersley suggests that Gouldner’s position leads him to depart from ‘sociological 
explanatory mode’ into what Hammersley describes as ‘rational talk about the 
mission of sociology’ (1998, p. 1.5) .  Hammersley comments that ‘What is envisaged 
here is a continuing dialectic between sociological theory and practice...[which 
Gouldner sees]... as forming part of a wider political process in which the structure 
of the whole society is transformed, facilitated by a strong relationship between 
radical sociologists and political activities; albeit with some autonomy preserved on 
both sides’ (1998, p. 3.3).  Hammersley dubs this a ‘grand conception’ of sociology’s 
role that could, he warns, expose sociology to bias, because it could lead the 
sociologist to prioritise her or his values over truth (1998, p. 4.1).  He concludes that 
sociologists should focus entirely on the factual and we should ‘do this in a way that 
takes no account of whether we believe what we are studying is good or bad’ (1998, 
p. 4.5).  Perhaps Hammersley is seeing too much advocacy in Gouldner’s position 
because, although Gouldner acknowledges the central role of values, he seems to 
reject advocacy-oriented sociology (Hollands and Stanley, 2009, 2).  Gouldner argues 
that knowledge claims must be ‘sociologically credible and politically transformative 
at the same time’ (Hollands and Stanley, 2009, 2.8).  Thus, sociologists can further 
the possibilities of emancipation through sociological study, but sociological theory 
should not be subordinate to advocacy.   
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It is useful to turn to Michael Burawoy at this point to try to unpick some of the 
issues here.  Burawoy (2005) engages with concerns about advocacy-oriented 
sociology by referring to the more acerbic views espoused by the sociologist Irving 
Louis Horowitz  (1993).  Horowitz claims that ‘Sociology has largely become a 
repository of discontent, a gathering of individuals who have special agendas, from 
gay and lesbian rights to liberation theology’ (1993, p. 12).  He is embittered by what 
he sees as the destruction of the objectivity and authority of sociology as, he 
laments, ‘The consequence of the influx of ideologists and special interests has been 
the outflow of scientists’ (1993, pp. 12-13).   Burawoy is, perhaps, somewhat 
perplexed by Horowitz’s complaint of the politicization of sociology (2005, p. 278). 
Horowitz himself argues that sociology is part of what he calls ‘the continued 
struggle for a humane world’ (1971, preface) and Burawoy (2005) sees the political 
direction of sociology as giving room for making a better world.  This making of a 
better world is a characteristic of Burawoy’s conceptualization of sociology as a field 
that takes in four ideal-typical forms; professional sociology (i.e. based in 
accumulated bodies of knowledge),  policy-oriented sociology (i.e. in service of a goal 
defined by a client), public sociology (i.e. in conversation with publics), and critical 
sociology (i.e. that promotes new research areas and examines  professional 
sociology with a view to making it aware of its biases and silences (2005, p. 271).   
Burawoy sees Gouldner’s reflexive approach to sociology as central in this regard. 
Even though Gouldner seems to be opposed to advocacy-oriented sociology, his 
general support of  a close relationship between sociology and values led to the 
development of a critical sociology that has become more radical (e.g. see Hollands 
and Stanley (2009)) in that it is often associated with advocacy-oriented sociology.  
Among the examples noted by Burawoy is the call by Dorothy Smith (1987a) for ‘A 
Sociology for Women’.    
Smith argues that claims of objectivity in sociology come from the male standpoint 
which, although ‘appearing to view the world from no place, in fact operates from 
the standpoint of the patriarchal relations of ruling’ (1987a, p. 221). This evident 
standpoint ‘discredits sociology’s claim to objective knowledge’ (Smith 1987a, p. 
221).  To counter this, Smith (1987a) advocates women’s standpoint, which reclaims 
the voice of women and all other disenfranchised members of society.  In doing so 
Smith does not abandon objectivity, rather she refashions it.  She argues for 
objectivity ‘in the minimal sense’ where ‘we can “test” different accounts against the 
actuality’ (Smith, 1987a, pp. 122-3).  Donna J. Haraway refers to feminist objectivity 
as ‘situated knowledge’ (1991, p. 188), which can be held accountable because it 
makes clear its partiality (1991, p. 188 - 190).  Although sociology such as this has 
been criticized (for example by Hammersley and by Horowitz), Liz Stanley observes 
that such advocacy-oriented sociology has become mainstream (2000, pp. 60-61).  
This is evidenced in its appearance as an unquestioned feature of discussion in some 
textbooks. For example, in his well known social research methods textbook Alan 
Bryman (2008) points out that women’s standpoint is put into practice in feminist 
research.  He notes that, for feminist researchers,   
‘to do research on women in an objective, value-neutral way would be 
undesirable (as well as being difficult to achieve) because it would be 
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incompatible with the values of feminism.  Instead, many feminist 
researchers advocate a stance that extols the virtues of a commitment to 
women and to exposing the conditions of their disadvantage in a male-
dominated society’ (2008, p. 103).    
 
Thus, Smith’s sociology is distinct from sociology that claims a conventional notion of 
objectivity as her sociology reveals its standpoint and adopts an advocacy-oriented 
approach.  Nevertheless, although advocacy-oriented sociology such as this has 
become mainstream, advocacy is not seen as equally acceptable or tolerable for all 
oppressed groups.  This seems to be the essence of the view expressed by the 
referee (above) in their seeming acceptance of advocacy-oriented work in sociology, 
yet a questioning of whether advocacy for nonhuman animals in sociology is 
appropriate.   
 
This calls to mind Howard S. Becker’s observation that ‘....the question is not 
whether we should take sides, since we inevitably will, but rather whose side are we 
on’ (1967, p. 239).  All understandings are partial but all understandings are not 
tolerated equally (Kirk and Miller, 1986, p. 11). Feminist researchers and theorists, 
such as Smith, have been very successful in arguing that taking the standpoint of 
women permits a fuller understanding of societies and of social and power relations 
within societies.   However, Smith sees her sociological approach as being applicable 
to a broader spectrum of devalued groups as she suggests that sociological enquiry 
‘can begin from the position of any member of the society, explicating the 
problematic of her or his experience as a sociological problematic’ (1987a, p. 99).  
But it seems that this can become highly contentious when it is applied to advocacy 
for nonhuman animals.  This brings me to my third problematic, which is the 
admissibility of nonhuman animals to advocacy-oriented sociology. 
 
sociology for humans and nonhuman animals 
 
Feminist sociologists have sought to make plain their position and many have chosen 
an advocacy-oriented approach in their work. Thus, as Sue Wilkinson and Celia 
Kitzinger point out, 'many feminists want both to enable the voices of Others to be 
heard, and to create social and political change for or on behalf of those Others' 
(1996, p. 20).  My focus in this paper is on sociological engagement with the material 
reality of the Others who are nonhuman animals.  Of course, human nonhuman 
animal relations differ greatly cross-culturally and historically, however, it would be 
hard to deny that nonhuman animals are oppressed and exploited by humans, and 
humans benefit from this oppression and exploitation.  Yet, sociology has 
traditionally failed to report on this oppression. Ted Benton’s (1993) work is a 
notable exception.  This early sociological work on human nonhuman animal 
relations focuses attention on the countless ways in which nonhuman animals are 
used as sources of economic profit for powerful humans (1993, p. 63). For instance, 
Benton’s nine broad categories of exploitation include the construction of 
nonhuman animals as private property,  the use of nonhuman animals to replace or 
enhance human labour and the use of nonhuman animals to meet human bodily 
needs (1993, p. 62 - 66).   Such early critical sociological works that centre on human 
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nonhuman animal relations are few and far between.  Although there are more now, 
still there are fewer than we might expect, given the prevalence and endurance of 
the oppression of nonhuman animals.   Sandra Harding and Kathryn Norberg provide 
one possible explanation for this.  In their discussion of feminist standpoint 
methodologies they argue that ‘Dominant groups are especially poorly equipped to 
identify oppressive features of their own beliefs and practices’ because ‘ their 
activities in daily life do not provide them with the intellectual and political resources 
necessary’  (2005, p.2101). This problem of limited intellectual and political 
resources connects with accusations of bias which are most often levelled at 
sociological work that ‘gives credence, in any serious way, to the perspective of the 
subordinate group in some hierarchical relationship’ (Becker, 1967, p. 240).  In 
contrast superordinates ‘are seen as having a more inclusive picture and as having 
the right to define the way things are’ (Becker, 1967, p. 240).  Critical Animal Studies 
seeks to challenge the problems associated with lack of  challenge to humanocentric 
perspectives and concerns about taking a standpoint on the human oppression of 
nonhuman animals by developing analyses in which understanding of the material 
experiences of nonhuman animals is central (Twine, 2010, p. 8). 
 
Like the broader field of Animal Studies, Critical Animal Studies is a multidisciplinary 
and transdisciplinary field (Cudworth, 2011, Twine 2010).   However, unlike Animal 
Studies, which focuses on the study of nonhuman animals, sociologists working in 
the field of Critical Animal Studies take an explicitly for nonhuman animals approach. 
Sociological approaches in this field draw on a range of perspectives, (for example, 
feminist theorizing, Marxist perspectives, Gouldner’s reflexive sociology, and 
Burawoy’s critical sociological approachviii), to problematise and query traditional 
sociological assumptions about human nonhuman animal relations.  This 
problematizing of such relations involves advocacy for nonhuman animals.  In this 
field, sociologists such as Erica Cudworth (2011), Leslie Irvine (2007), David Nibert 
(2002, 2003) and Richard Twine (2010) are explicit in their advocacy for nonhuman 
animals.  Such work seeks to unsettle ontological frameworks (used in sociology and 
beyond) that divide humans and nonhuman animals along hierarchical lines; 
frameworks that underpin yet render invisible the human oppression of nonhuman 
animals.  As we have seen above, advocacy-oriented sociology has become 
mainstream thus it could be argued that advocacy-oriented sociology has entered a 
newer ‘tradition’ of sociology, but this newer revised, reflexive and critical tradition 
is still largely focussed on the oppression of devalued human groups.  As vital as this 
focus is, it leaves unquestioned the oppression of nonhuman animals. The essential 
work that sociology does regarding the questioning of the naturalization of the 
oppression of devalued groups of humans is extended by sociologists working in the 
field of Critical Animal Studies.    The feminist concept of intersectionality is central 
to the Critical Animal Studies response to the oversight in the newer sociological 
tradition.  Perspectives that centre on intersectionality provide a challenge to the 
disregarding of the oppression of nonhuman animals by centring on the complexities 
of oppressions associated with various and compound differences.   
 
The concept of intersectionality is a crucial concept in reflexive feminist theory (Cole 
2009, p. 173).  The concept was honed by feminist theorists and anti-racist theorists 
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in response to charges that the focus of their studies had, in the past, centred on 
‘the most privileged members of subordinate groups’ (Cole 2009, p. 172).  
Intersectionality is an analytic approach that recognizes and responds to multiple 
differences at one and the same time.  In doing so it centres on the experiences of 
groups holding ‘multiple disadvantaged statuses’ and observes that ‘some members 
of disadvantaged groups also hold privileged identities’ (Cole, 2009, p. 173).  In the 
reflexive field of Critical Animal Studies the concept of intersectionality is crucial 
(Twine 2010).  Work in Critical Animal Studies incorporates human nonhuman animal 
relations as an intersectionalized juncture, which exposes the intersections between 
the domination of nonhuman animals and other systems of domination.  Carol 
Adams observes that some groups of people and all nonhuman animals are cast as 
Others (1995, p. 78).  Centring on racist discourses as one example, she argues that 
‘When white racism uses an animalizing discourse against black people it 
demonstrates the way supremacist ideology inscribes intersecting forms of 
otherness (races and species)’ (Adams, 1995, p. 80).  In addition, as we have seen, 
taking into account the intersectionality of oppressions involves, as Elizabeth, R. 
Coles (2009) makes clear, taking account of the privileged identities that some 
members of devalued groups can also hold.   A posthumanist reading of 
intersectionality is fundamental here (Twine 2011, p. 12).  Although a  slippery 
concept (Cudworth, 2011),  Cary Wolfe’s (2010) posthumanist approach seeks to 
overcome humanocentric ways of looking at the world and rejects classic divisions 
found in sociology (and beyond) such as human and animal, self and no-self and  
intelligence and instinct.  A posthumanist approach to intersectionality facilitates 
dialogue between the challenge to the humanocentric standpoint with recognition 
of the the complexities of oppressions associated with various and compound 
differences associated with being human and nonhuman.  As Barbara Hayles notes, 
‘human life is embedded in a material world of great complexity’ (1999, p.5). If we 
move away from formulating the ‘human’ as ‘the chief point of reference’ (Philo, 
1998, p. 54), sociology can tell us much about the oppression of nonhuman animals 
and about the intersections between the oppression of nonhuman animals and the 
oppression of devalued groups of humans.     
 
Let me return to my two central questions; should sociology include the study of 
nonhuman animals and can sociology advocate for nonhuman animals?   The answer 
to question one is clearly ‘yes’.  Our lives are infused with nonhuman animals and we 
are embedded in multifaceted life worlds.  For sociology to be about societies in all 
their complexities it must recognise this.  Sociology has a great deal to offer to our 
understanding of human relations with nonhuman animals.  Thus, nonhuman 
animals should be essential to sociological studies. It is not easy to see why this 
should be controversial.   
 
Question two seems to be more controversial.  Although advocacy-oriented 
sociology has become more acceptable and mainstream (though still criticized by 
some sociologists, Hammersley among them), advocacy for nonhuman animals is 
largely seen as outside the remit of sociology.  Arluke suggests that such a 
standpoint might be a symptom of ‘political and psychological insecurities’ among 
sociologists who see sociological inquiry about the oppression of nonhuman animals 
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as debasing the study of important human oppressions (2002, p. 1).   It is a sobering 
to think that sociology could be upholding rather than questioning hierarchies of 
oppressions. However, there is more to it than this. Sociologists are humans and, as 
humans, we benefit from the privileges of being human rather than nonhuman.  
Nibert comments that, 
 
 ‘Members of the discipline [sociology], who like most other humans in 
society partake in the privileges derived from entangled oppressions – such 
as eating and drinking substances derived from the bodies of “others”, 
wearing their skin and hair, and enjoying the entertainment value their 
exploitation provides – can do so only by accepting the self-interested 
realities crafted by powerful agribusiness, pharmaceutical and other 
industries that rely on public acquiescence in oppressive social arrangements.  
Privilege is not so easy to give up.  Silence, denial and substantial intellectual 
acrobatics are necessary for oppression in all forms to continue’ (2003, pp. 
20-21)  
 
Anatol Rapoport observes that ‘the self proclaimed detached objectivity of the 
sociologists is not objectivity at all but a commitment to a status quo  by people who 
have internalized a set of values’ (1964, p. 102).  Our values inform our lives, our 
notions of what is sociology and our ideas about how sociology should be done.  A 
critical approach to sociology encourages reflection upon our own standpoints; 
standpoints that belie the possibility of objectivity and in which the standpoint of 
human remains the most unchallenged of all.  Sociology has so much to offer the 
study of human nonhuman animal relations, as is evidenced by the work that is 
being done in the field.  Professional sociologists (for example journal referees) have 
a key role to play in enabling this work to move from margins to centre in published 
sociology.    
  
notes 
i An earlier version of this paper was presented to the British Sociological Association 
Annual Conference, London School of Economics 2011. 
ii The name of the journal was not revealed when the paper was presented to the 
British Sociological Association Annual Conference, London School of Economics 
2011.  
iii The paper was published...... Author 2010 
iv Nibert adds that, in sociology, nonhuman animals ‘to the extent that they can be – 
[can be studied] in the absence of human imposition’ (2003, p. 21). 
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v However, Corwin Kruse (2002) notes some disquiet among sociologists in the 
United States in reaction to the development of the ASA group.   
vi Especially pertinent here as a recent special issue of The Sociological Review was 
devoted to ‘imagining the political’ in sociology, (for example see Nickie Charles and 
Dennis Smith’s (2010) editorial introduction to the special issue). 
vii Sociologists such as Leslie Irvine (2007) and Arnold Arluke and Clifton Sanders 
(1996) argue that there is a good deal of evidence that shows, for example,  that many 
other animal species see their selves as objects and are more complex creatures than is 
assumed.  For this reason they can be the subject matter of sociology. 
viii  Alvin Gouldner and Michael Burawoy overlook nonhuman animals.  For example, 
Richard Twine identifies the problems with Burawoy’s view that sociology is about 
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